No doubt about it: Iraq is a terrorist nation. Saddam Hussein’s government used chemical weapons against its own Kurdish population in 1988 and it invaded and terrorized citizens and residents of Kuwait in 1990. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, it has terrorized its own citizens by evading UN weapons’ inspections and by diverting oil-for-food funds to the military. Most experts believe Iraq is using these funds to build up its infrastructure for the manufacture of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Nonetheless, no credible evidence has emerged to show that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks on the United States. And yet, Iraq is very likely to be the next target in the war on terrorism. A faction in the DOD led by Assistant Secretary Paul Wolfowitz has long pressed for a "regime change" in Iraq. It is time, the group argues, to finish the Gulf War by removing Saddam Hussein from power—an argument that didn’t go far until the war in Afghanistan. The relatively swift overthrow of the Taliban makes an attack on Hussein tempting now, but that speed and success should not be taken as the template for war with Iraq, where there is no armed and organized opposition like the Northern Alliance and where there is a strong and well-organized central government. Saddam Hussein is not, like Mullah Omar, a religious leader who happened to become head of government, nor is the Republican Guard a ragtag army like the Taliban. Precisely because Hussein is a terrorist, a U.S. attack could set loose an array of weapons and tactics that the United States might find hard to counter, and that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel have long feared would be used against them. The stability of the whole region is singularly precarious at the moment; an attack by the United States on Iraq would only increase the danger.
Until convincing evidence of Iraq’s complicity in September 11 is produced and made public or until Iraq is shown to be supporting or harboring Al Qaeda cells, policy toward Iraq should continue along its present track of containment and deterrence, sanctions and no-fly zones. Better yet, it could follow a modified sanctions track promised by a reinvigorated UN discussion of new "smart" sanctions. These are selective sanctions that clearly identify and prohibit dual-use materials and technologies while loosening the sanctions on civilian goods. The threat of a U.S. attack has had this potentially positive effect: Iraq has returned to the UN bargaining table. It is possible that Saddam Hussein may be prepared to do what he promised to do in 1991: give up his weapons of mass destruction and allow comprehensive, complete, and unannounced weapons inspections by the UN, in return for the implicit bargain that he gets to stay in power. If he is a man without weapons of mass destruction, he ceases to be a threat to his neighbors and to the rest of the world. Then it is up to the Iraqi people to rid themselves of this tyrant. That may not be easy or swift, but it is far better and safer than having the United States do it for them.
March 12, 2002
