As an exercise in the possibilities of frustration, Vietnam is a stunning success. Perhaps the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese supporters have no sense of frustration. Yet it is hard to believe that they can be very happy about the mushrooming American intervention. Whatever their state of mind, however, there can be little doubt about the American sense of frustration. Nothing at all has really worked in South Vietnam, either politically or militarily. Politically, one regime has followed another; the advent of Premier Ky, a man of talents even more dubious than those of his predecessors, stands as a painful symbol of the political bungling and disarray. Militarily, the failure of the bombings of North Vietnam to make any noticeable difference in the course of the war shows graphically the make-shift nature of the power response.
In a situation where nothing in the past has worked, where nothing being tried at present is working and where nothing likely to be tried in the future promises to work, where does one go? The direction of the Administration, now patent, is to increase the commitment of ground troops, to continue aerial harassment and to live with whatever South Vietnamese government happens to be in power. To be sure, the Administration shows a willingness to probe for diplomatic openings, to keep looking for the glimmer of a political solution, but it hardly does so in an expectant mood. The thinking seems to be that somehow, someday, the Viet Cong and North Vietnam will grow weary of the whole business or be afflicted with a sudden onset of fear; then they’ll be ready to talk. That strategy has all the appearances of a policy, if “policy” is defined as a mixture of strong talk, frenetic activity and wishful thinking.
The trouble here is that, bit by bit, the earlier emphasis on the necessity for a political solution is being pushed aside. Whether this is deliberate or not is hard to say; but the big talk these days is troop movements, strafing missions, Marine landings and “search and destroy” expeditions. The transition has been subtle, but unmistakable. Robert Kennedy, for one, has performed a useful service in pointing this out. More troops and more napalm bombs will not win the war in Vietnam. The point is obvious, trite and familiar—and, for that reason, easy to overlook in the colorful panoply of men, ships and planes.
Yet the understanding of this point requires, we believe, something more nuanced than the position expressed in the appeal issued by the “Clergymen’s Emergency Committee for Vietnam” and printed on the back cover of this issue. Moral self-righteousness, whether from the left or right, merely clouds the issues: morality, yes; sheer moralizing, no. The problem in Vietnam has not been the absence of lofty American aspirations, as the signatories imply, but rather of aspirations unsupported by sufficient political intelligence and realism. Nor has the cause been an “unworthy” one; instead, it has been a cause undermined by a dearth of insight and consistency. It is terribly tidy to impute immorality to the Administration and to call, “in the name of God,” for it to desist from its present course; but there have been no reports that God has revealed to anyone His plan for a Vietnamese solution.
More to the point is Representative Reuss’ call for a U.N, role in Vietnam, spelled out on page 523 of this issue. He correctly points out that the failure of the Administration to take the issue to the U.N. evidences a “disrespect” for both the letter and the spirit of its Charter. The word “disrespect” is fitting here; it is not immoral per se for a nation to by-pass the U.N., but, by and large, it ill serves the cause of peace for a nation to do so. Of equal importance, the U.N. has demonstrated that it can effectively step in when the conditions are right; and that is one prime reason for its very existence. As Representative Reuss indicates, the U.N. is not likely to provide a magic solution. That is not necessary. What counts is that it be given a decent chance to muster its moral prestige and the intelligence of its members.
Already it is too late to talk about “escalating” the war in Vietnam. Escalation is now a given fact and the only remaining question is: how far will it go? To date, there are no indications that either side is willing to call a halt to its military activities. Three immediate steps are open to the United States to stop the escalation. First, to cease bombing North Vietnam; second, to announce a willingness to negotiate with the Viet Cong; and, third, to take the issue to the U.N.
