On February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the UN Security Council with evidence-some dramatic-that Iraq continues to evade the efforts of the UN’s weapons inspectors. Most compelling in Powell’s testimony were intercepts of the Iraqi military discussing the need to hide chemical weapons. In addition, Powell presented satellite images purportedly showing the removal of munitions from one site shortly before the arrival of UN inspectors. Information gathered from defectors and prisoners also seemed to confirm the existence of Iraqi mobile bioweapons laboratories. Powell made a strong case, despite questionable efforts to link Baghdad to alleged Al Qaeda operatives involved in the assassination of an American diplomat in Jordan.
Much of the information Iraq has provided the UN about its weapons has been incomplete or bogus. Enormous quantities of anthrax, chemical bombs, VX gas, and other bioagents remain unaccounted for. UN resolution 1441, passed unanimously by the Security Council in November, requires Iraq to make a complete accounting of its weapons of mass destruction and to cooperate fully with the inspectors. No one seriously believes that Iraq has disposed of all its biological and chemical weapons, yet Iraq has presented no evidence that it has any. Earlier testimony by the UN’s chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, was equally damning. Blix said that "Iraq has neither come forth with a full and complete declaration of its weapons of mass destruction, nor has it been cooperating immediately and unconditionally and actively." On its face, Iraq stands in violation of 1441 and subject to the "serious consequences" stipulated by the resolution.
Yet the Security Council remains deeply divided, both about the purpose of inspections and what consequences should follow Iraqi noncompliance. On February 14, Blix presented a second report, this one indicating progress had been made on procedural questions, noting a greater degree of Iraqi cooperation, and taking issue with parts of Powell’s testimony. Still, no evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction has been found, Blix emphasized.
The debate in the Security Council following Blix’s second report showed that different countries are working from different assumptions about what is required of Iraq. The United States, along with Britain, argues that inspections are not a game of hide-and-seek, and cannot work unless Iraq cooperates actively and fully. Resolution 1441 was understood to be a "last chance." Twelve years after the Gulf War, Iraq has been given every opportunity to prove it has disarmed. Giving the inspections more time only plays into Saddam Hussein’s obvious strategy of delay and avoidance. Only the threat of force enabled inspectors to return, and only the authorization of force in a second UN resolution will convince Saddam that the international community is serious.
France, backed by Germany and others, avoids the question of whether 1441 has been violated and argues that the inspections are working. More inspectors and more time, it argues, will bring even better results. Without specific evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction, war is not justified. "Disputed military action," France argues, might "exacerbate...divisions that nurture terrorism."
With close to 200,000 American, British, and Australian troops massing on Iraq’s borders, France’s doubts have not gone down well in Washington. Especially alarming was the initial willingness, since rescinded, of France, Germany, and Belgium to split the NATO alliance by refusing to help Turkey prepare to defend itself in case of war. These disagreements and the general disarray in the Western alliance are serious, but were mollified by the European Union’s February 17 declaration that "it is for the Iraq regime to end this crisis by complying with the demands of the Security Council." Still, there is plenty of blame on both sides of the Atlantic for this display of mutual antipathy. Certainly President George W. Bush’s dubious "doctrine of preemption" has turned potential allies into suspicious critics. Yet the suggestion that the United States, not Iraq, is the problem is equally risible. Is it plausible that more inspectors will bring about Iraqi disarmament when eight years of inspections in the 1990s failed to? Does France really believe Iraq has destroyed its anthrax and VX gas? Does it believe Saddam has given up his dream of acquiring a nuclear weapon? Does it think the sort of pressure being applied to Iraq now, and which has brought forth minimal cooperation, can be sustained indefinitely? Those opposed to military action in the near future have yet to answer these questions satisfactorily.
Still, the Bush administration must show patience, ratchet down its rhetorical attacks against those understandably hesitant to go to war, and continue to make its case for a second UN resolution. The United States should go the extra mile, and then some, to broaden support for possible military action. As popular resistance to war grows in Europe and the United States, there is little to lose, and much to gain, in giving inspectors more time. More important, President Bush must stop playing just the "tough cop" and make clear what specific steps Iraq can still take to avoid war. Bush must put an exit strategy, not just a war strategy on the table. Happily, news reports suggest that the administration is determined to continue to seek UN approval over the next few weeks, working with Blix to establish a series of "benchmarks" for the Iraqi regime to meet. If Iraq complies, further pressure can be applied in the hope of further disclosures. If Iraq does not, the danger the regime poses will become clearer to skeptics.
At this late hour, given Iraq’s history of deception, the best hope for peace seems to be a second UN resolution that, by removing any doubt about the international community’s resolve to use military force, compels Saddam to either disarm or go into exile. And if he refuses? Bush has been unconvincing in arguing that Iraq presents an "imminent" threat to the United States. But Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait didn’t do so either. Rather, the invasion violated a principle of international law, threatening the stability of the international system. Arguably, Iraq’s continued defiance of the UN presents a similar threat.
The UN’s credibility, as much as that of the United States, is on the line. Saddam Hussein evaded disarmament in the 1990s by outfoxing and outlasting the UN coalition supporting inspections and sanctions. At this point, with the spectacle of a fractious Security Council, Saddam has no reason to think he can’t do it again. George Bush’s diplomatic blundering should not obscure how dangerous that outcome would be. February 18, 2003
