THE Soviet Union appears to be pushing an idea prominent in its designs some ten years back. At the time there was something persuasive about the Russian object of a buffer zone of neutral States with “friendly” governments on its western borders. Russia had been savagely invaded by Nazi Germany. Large areas had been laid waste; millions of soIdiers and civilians had been killed. The invader had finally been driven out only by desperate Russian resistance (and the advance of the Allies in the West). The scheme sounded fairly reasonable, but before long it was perceived how “friendly” those governments had to be.
The neutral belt the Soviet leaders are now after would be considerably broader. It would include Germany itself. No doubt these neutralized nations would, at least at first, enjoy more autonomy than those which fell under the knout during the past decade. But regardless of the extent of the buffer region’s autonomy, such a scheme would jettison the whole defense plan of the West.
According to the latest Russian proposals—involving the neutralization scheme—the West would have to withdraw from the advanced air bases which have served as such an effective deterrent until now; the newly completed NATO structure would collapse; armed forces would be reduced or held down, much to the USSR’s comparative advantage.
What, then, is to be gained by falling in with this Kremlin scheme? It will doubtless be seized on by perennial optimists together with the Austrian treaty, the revised Soviet disarmament proposals and the generally more conciliatory tone of Moscow and Peiping, as indicative that the policy of relentless expansion has been abandoned.
That is to be devoutly hoped but the signs continue to point in a counter direction. Communist parties, directed from Moscow, continue to agitate, plot and wait their chance in all sectors of the globe. The somewhat alarming development of the offensive arm of the Soviet air force, Communist sabotage of the recent UN Disarmament Conference and certain crippling provisions of the proposed Soviet disarmament terms themselves supply proof enough. The efforts of the reigning Soviet junta to relax international tensions, for whatever do- mestic reasons, are actually means of moving ahead in their plans for wider and wider domination.
This is the context in which top level talks will have to be worked out. The United States cannot afford to keep its powder dry in such a manner that a failure of these parleys to produce anything substantial can be laid at our door. The stalemate resulting from the conjunction of advanced Western air bases and greatly superior Russian ground forces is infinitely preferable to a retreat. The painfully built up NATO defense system, the foundations of which are just completed, can hardly be abandoned without overwhelmingly compelling reasons. With all the bitter experiences of the past ten years to go on, it is unlikely that American negotiators will be misled.
Perhaps the real problem for our negotiators is that of tact. For all their deviousness the Soviets have made considerable progress toward a gradual disarmament plan that would contain the necessary safeguards. They are, if temporarily, adopting a more conciliatory tone; travel in the Soviet Union and on the part of certain Soviet citizens is beginning to open up. The task is therefore to encourage every sign of conciliation without at any point weakening the common defenses of the West.
