To war or not against Iraq? When? How? Above all: Why? These questions have dominated U.S. foreign policy and the headlines for the past three months. President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and other administration officials have given speeches, offered retorts to their critics, and tried to force world leaders and the U.S. Congress into agreeing to a military attack. Iraq has replaced Al Qaeda as the front line in the war against terrorism and Saddam Hussein has replaced Osama bin Laden as enemy number one. The administration’s bellicose claims notwithstanding, we know little more about the Iraqi threat today than we did in July. The British government’s September 24 white paper compiled with the aid of the United States contains the best information we are likely to have about Iraqi weapons systems. Except for greater detail on matters already public, there is no information that would compel agreement with the president’s press for an imminent military attack. At the moment, we still have no convincing answers-certainly not to the all-important: "Why war?" "Why now?"
No doubt, complex calculations are involved in the administration’s strategy: The threat of war can be diplomacy by other means. After Bush’s sobering speech to the UN on September 12, it seemed that the administration’s saber rattling might be directed less to military action than to fortifying UN resolve in insisting on unfettered inspections and the disarmament of Iraq. The president was initially successful in galvanizing the UN to action. But then when Iraq agreed to renewed inspections, the UN balked at the U.S. demand that the resolution renewing inspections include authorization for a military attack should Iraq impede the inspections. With the Europeans, the UN resists acquiescence in the demand for one resolution, in effect giving the United States final say in whether, or when, the inspection regime has failed. The UN wants one resolution for renewed inspections and a second authorizing military action only if the inspections collapse. That remains the sticking point in the negotiations. The position of the UN and a majority of the Security Council is not unreasonable, since the U.S. resolution would commit the UN to war against Iraq.
On September 19, the president sent Congress a resolution that would authorize him "to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce" UN resolutions, "defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region." Resistance to a unilateral declaration of war and this all-encompassing language has grown in the House and Senate and the administration may give way on various points. But in an election year it is near impossible for Congress to do what it ought-conduct a far-ranging debate and slow the president down. More scrutiny needs to go into this decision.
If the threat of war is diplomatic maneuvering that will end not in war, but in thorough and lasting inspections, followed by the destruction of Iraq’s actual (or potential for developing) weapons of mass destruction, who could object? On the other hand, what if the administration’s rhetoric and bullying end in painting it into a corner, leaving no choice but to go to war (lest the United States appear weak and vacillating)? War may be the intended outcome of Bush, Cheney, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (the policy’s architect), but it is a problematic one to many others.
The world, including most of the Arab world, recognizes the danger Iraq poses to its own citizens and to the Middle East. But as the Bush administration continues to press for military action with doubtful factual claims, dubious arguments, and no after-war plan for Iraq, the United States itself is seen to be a threat to the long-term prospects for peace in the Middle East. But it is not only the rest of the world that fears this danger.
In testimony before the Senate, three retired generals, including former head of the joint chiefs, John Shalikashvili, and former NATO commander, Wesley Clark, counseled against unilateral action. They make a reasonable point. Bishop Wilton Gregory, president of the USCCB, in a letter to Bush expressed doubt that unilateral military action could meet just-war criteria, and urged a "step back from the brink of war." He is right. A distinguished group of Christian ethicists meeting in Washington on September 25 concluded that no morally compelling case for war has been made. They are right. (Reflecting the surreal nature of the administration’s obsession with Iraq, and other foreign antagonists, Gary Trudeau’s Doonesbury cartoon called for war against America’s real enemy-France! Far-fetched?)
Consider Germany, the administration’s most recent enemy du jour. Germany became nation non grata when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder promised, during the recent election, not to send German troops to fight in Iraq. The Bush administration’s petulant response to the chancellor’s position-which helped his coalition win re-election-is another chilling expression of the administration’s unilateralist and triumphalistic posturing. This rift between two staunch allies will be mended. The question of war against Iraq is far more important; at the moment, it appears to be neither necessary nor just. Yet the manner in which the only superpower conducts its foreign policy, whether with enemies like Iraq or friends like Germany, is cause for criticism, and if necessary dissent, not only by the world, but by Americans, above all.
October 1, 2002
