Last Thursday, the New York Times reported on the controversy surrounding British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's "Terror Bill," which extends the time that the government is able to detain terrorism suspects without charges. In protest, at least one Member of Parliament has resigned. In the May 31 issue of the Tablet, former British Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Michael Quinlan offered some considerations on when the clash between so-called private religious values and public duties in a diverse democracy might force one to resign.First, he recommends that civil servants consider carefully the decision to leave publicly held office given that "civil servants and elected politicians have voluntarily accepted to give the best service they can, in good times and bad, to a pluralist society governed by laws democratically arrived at and by office-holders legitimately put in place. They ought to recognize that bailing out when the going gets awkward is a grave matter only to be done if we are very sure of our ground and its importance."Second, he appeals to levels of responsibility in the degree to which one is culpable for the action of the government he or she serves. He writes, "You're a typist in the Secretary of State's office. Do you refuse to type Geoff Hoon's speeches defending the invasion? Surely not, for you have no significant responsibility. But if you're a soldier in the armed forces with misgivings? I would say that you are entitled to rest on the fact that the Attorney General has said that the operation is legal and Parliament has endorsed our participation.... But suppose you're the cabinet minister sharing in the final decision-taking? The answer then becomes clear."Third, he highlights the importance of knowing what you're getting into in order to avoid the clash of personal values and public duties. He writes, "There is, I think, an obligation to look ahead when one takes on a particular form of public service. One can't always foresee the stumbling blocks, but sometimes it is clear that a given field of work is going to be potentially awkward."Three issues I see with Quinlan's take. In the first two considerations he offers, there is a heavy emphasis placed on the legitimating power of procedure in establishing what is ethically just. The soldier does as he's told, because he is subordinate to the democratic will exercised by his government. I fear that this gives priority to the wisdom of the bureaucracy over conscience, and alarmingly smacks of Hannah Arendt's warning against the "banality of evil" evidenced in the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who claimed he was "just doing his duty" for what he took to be a legitimate government. In short, the sphere of responsibility is often more inclusive than we might like to believe. Second, in all three considerations a degree of certainty is expected of one making the difficult decision to leave his or her post. But how often does one's conscience speak with such clarity? Perhaps, the slight awkwardness one feels is enough to recommend their refusal to be complicit in an action. Finally, is avoidance the best way to deal with positions that bring religious values and civic duties into conflict, or should we not humbly begin to mine these moments of consternation for the unresolved complications they might reveal even concerning those positions our society has come to hold in high esteem?
